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A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO ABANDON
THE REASONABLE OBSERVER
FRAMEWORK IN SACRED TEXT CASES:
MCCREARY COUNTY v. A CLU OF KENTUCKY
AND
VAN ORDEN v. PERRY
SUSAN HANLEY KOSSE *
INTRODUCTION
Justice Kennedy summed up the inherent dilemma in sacred
text cases with the following excerpt during oral arguments:
Suppose you had a county 100 miles away or a
state, a different state, and the same display
was put on and the recitation was -and it was a
sincere recitation, that the government simply
wanted to recognize that the 10
Commandments has played an important role
in the civic lives of our people. Then you
have-they're each up for five years and five
years later, some school kids wander by one
and they wander by the other. In your view,
from what you're telling me, the
Commandments are permitted in one location
and not the other? I mean, that's the necessary
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purport of your argument. You may not think
that either of them are valid but on this prong
of the argument, it seems to me that to
differentiate, I just don't understand that.'
Justice Kennedy's hypothetical did not need a five year time
gap to actually manifest. Within one month of the McCreary
County oral arguments, the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments display in Elkhart, Indiana was the subject of
judicial review.2 The similarities between the McCreary County
and the Elkhart display were striking:
* Both displays were posted in government
buildings.3
* Both displays were entitled "Foundations of
American Law and Government.,
4
" Both displays contained a framed text of the
King James' version of the Ten
Commandments.5
" Both displays also contained the same
collection of "significant historical
documents and symbols.",
6
" The documents in both displays were all the
same size and framed identically.7
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, ACLU v. McCreary County,
125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No. 03-1693), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/03-1693.pdf.
2. See Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 858 (7th Cir. 2005); ACLU
v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 2003), aftd, - U.S. __, 125
S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
3. Books, 401 F.3d at 858; McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 440.
4. Books, 401 F.3d at 858; McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 443.
5. Books, 401 F.3d at 858; McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 443 n.2.
6. Books, 401 F.3d at 858; McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 443. The King
James' version of the Ten Commandments, Magna Carta, Declaration of
Independence, Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, text of the Star-
Spangled Banner, national motto emblem ("In God We Trust"), Mayflower
Compact of 1620, and a picture of Lady Justice were some of the items
included in both displays.
7. Books, 401 F.3d at 859; McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 480 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
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The stated purpose of the Indiana display was to "positively
contribute to the educational foundation and moral character of the
citizens of [Elkhart] county."8 The stated purpose of the McCreary
County display in Kentucky was to educate county residents about
the impact various historical documents had on the foundation of
our laws. 9
Both the Indiana and the Kentucky displays contained
explanatory text next to the Ten Commandments stating that "[t]he
Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of
Western legal thought and the formation of our country"' and
provide the "moral background of the Declaration of Independence
and the foundation of our legal system.""
A person observing the two displays would see essentially
identical presentations. As Justice Kennedy noted, schoolchildren
passing by in five years would view nearly identical displays. Yet
despite all of these similarities, the Seventh Circuit ruled the
Indiana display constitutional,'2 while the Sixth Circuit ruled the
Kentucky display unconstitutional 3 for the primary reason that the
improper religious purpose articulated for Kentucky's original
14
stand-alone display tainted the final version.
The contrasting results of these two cases occurred because
of the flawed reasonable observer framework used in
Establishment Clause cases. This framework focuses on the fiction
of an observer who somehow knows the history and context of the
community and forum of the particular religious display. This
Article examines the reasonable observer framework in
Establishment Clause cases, specifically in relation to the two most
recent Ten Commandments cases decided by the Supreme Court.
Part I describes the evolution of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence from the three-prong Lemon test to Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test and the various definitions of a
8. Books, 401 F.3d at 859.
9. McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 441.
10. Books, 401 F.3d at 860.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 858.
13. McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 440.
14. Id. at 454-58.
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reasonable observer as applied by federal courts. Part II
summarizes the history of Ten Commandment cases in the United
States Supreme Court and examines, in detail, McCreary County v.
ACLU15 and Van Orden v. Perry,16 the two recent sacred text
decisions. Part III analyzes and describes the inherent problems
with the reasonable observer framework. Finally, Part IV
recommends the elimination of the current reasonable observer
framework and proposes the adoption of a new framework which
presumes an improper purpose when the government displays a
sacred text. This proposed presumption of unconstitutionality test
may be rebutted if the government demonstrates that the sacred
text is used either in a de minimis fashion or is sufficiently narrowly
tailored such that a logical connection exists between the sacred
text and the surrounding theme at the site of the display.
Substituting this new framework in the adjudication of sacred text
cases would eliminate the current problem of different results for
identical displays.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment of the Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... Plaintiffs
nationwide invoke the Establishment Clause when bringing suits
challenging governmental religious displays. Courts have
traditionally used the Lemon test, a three-pronged analysis, to
resolve these disputes, requiring the government activity to: (1)
have a secular purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect "that
neither advances nor inhibits religion;" and (3) not involve
excessive entanglement with religion.18
15. __ U.S. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
16. __ U.S. - 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that state
statutes providing financial support to non-public elementary and secondary
schools were unconstitutional due to excessive government entanglement with
religion).
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Over the past thirty plus years, there has been much
confusion in the lower courts regarding the Lemon test.' 9 Even the
Supreme Court has ignored or modified the Lemon test in
subsequent Establishment Clause cases. Perhaps the biggest
modification came in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v.
Donnelly, a case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a holiday display. In Lynch, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island
displayed various holiday symbols in a park owned by a non-profit
organization.22 The display's items, owned by the city, included
Santa's house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, carolers, clowns,
elephants, colored lights, a Christmas tree, a Seasons Greetings
banner, and a creche.23 The ACLU, with city residents, sued the
city for including the creche, alleging an Establishment Clause
24
violation. The Court upheld the entire display finding that the city
of Pawtucket did not endorse Christianity by including the creche
since a secular purpose existed for the display. 5 In addition, the
19. See, e.g., infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
20. Justice Scalia has criticized the Court for its selective adherence to
Lemon:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again ....
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that
it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our
audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can
command it to return to the tomb at will. When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it;
when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore
it entirely .... Such a docile and useful monster is
worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state;
one never knows when one might need him.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
21. 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984).
22. Id. at 671.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 685.
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Court concluded no excessive entanglement existed, therefore
26satisfying the third prong of the Lemon test.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion and first
introduced her idea of modifying Lemon with what is now
commonly referred to as the "endorsement test., 27 Essentially, this
test asks what message the government intended to convey with the
display and what message the governmental action actually
conveyed." This refinement collapses the first and second prongs
of the Lemon test together in a highly fact-specific inquiry focusing
heavily on the perceptions of a reasonable observer. The Court,
29however, has not resolved precisely who is a reasonable observer.
A. Justice O'Connor's Definition of a Reasonable Observer
In her concurrence in Allegheny v. ACLU,3 Justice
O'Connor hinted that her definition of a reasonable observer is
someone who possesses a certain level of information, including the
"history and ubiquity" of an action and the values underpinning the
Free Exercise Clause.3' This concept of a knowledgeable
26. Id.
27. Id. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Post-Lynch, there has been
some confusion about whether the endorsement test is a separate test or
merged into the Lemon test. See Jeanne Anderson, The Revolution Against
Evolution, Or "Well, Darwin, We're Not in Kansas Anymore," 29 J. L. &
EDUC. 398, 399-400 (2000).
28. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691.
29. In Good News Club v. Mildford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 127-30
(2001), the Court appeared to be adopting Justice O'Connor's definition of a
reasonable observer, but Justice Breyer's concurrence prevented a majority on
this issue because he argued that the case failed on procedural grounds.
Justice O'Connor's definition of a reasonable observer is based on the tort law
definition of a reasonable person. This hypothetical person is "a model of all
proper qualities, with only those human shortcomings and weaknesses which
the community will tolerate on the occasion .... [H]e is... a personification
of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury's social
judgment." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 174-75 (5th ed. 1984)
30. 492 U.S. 575 (1989).
31. Id. at 630-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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reasonable observer took shape more clearly in her concurrence in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette.32 Justice
O'Connor dismissed a reasonable observer definition that would
focus on the passerby and instead favored a definition "similar to
the 'reasonable person' in tort law, who 'is not to be identified with
any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable
things,' but is 'rather a personification of a community ideal of
reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social
judgment.' 3 3  This reasonable observer would have more
information than some members of society, including "the history
and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears. ' 3" The reasonable observer would also be
"acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute" concerning the display." The reasonable observer
gleans knowledge from the actual display itself as well as by having
background knowledge of the general history of prior governmental
36displays and usage of space. Justice O'Connor discounts Justice
Stevens' characterization of her reasonable observer as an
"'ultrareasonable' observer who understands the vagaries of the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence," and argues that the
reasonable observer is not required to know specific legal
37definitions, only how public places have been used in the past.
Applying this definition to the facts in Capitol Square,
Justice O'Connor concluded that a reasonable observer would not
perceive the government to be endorsing religion if it allowed the
temporary display of a Ku Klux Klan cross by a private group on
public property."' Emphasizing a "collective standard" over actual
individual perceptions, she attributed to a reasonable observer
"knowledge that the cross is a religious symbol, that Capitol Square
32. 515 U.S. 753, 772-83 (1995) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
33. Id. at 779-80 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, at 175
(alteration in original)).
34. Id. at 780 (plurality opinion).
35. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780-81.
37. Id. at 781.
38. Id. at 782.
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is owned by the State, and that the large building nearby is the seat
of state government., 39  In addition, she attributed to the
reasonable observer knowledge of the prior history of the park's
usage which in this case had been a forum traditionally open to the
public for private expression.4° Justice O'Connor concluded that
this knowledge enabled a reasonable observer to reach the
conclusion that the State was not endorsing the Klan's private
41
religious message.
B. Justice Stevens' Definition of a Reasonable Observer
Highly critical of Justice O'Connor's definition, Justice
Stevens' dissent in Capitol Square indicates that he prefers a
reasonable observer definition that would not make the individual a
"well-schooled jurist" or "a being finer than the tort-law model., 42
Trying to encompass more than the "'ideal' observer," he would
"extend protection to the universe of reasonable persons and ask
whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely to
perceive a government endorsement., 43 The perception that the
government is endorsing religion would need to be objectively
reasonable, which he argued alleviates Justice O'Connor's fear that
there will always be someone offended."
Applying his reasonable observer definition, Justice Stevens
concluded that since the cross was placed on land the government
controlled, a reasonable observer would perceive at least an implicit
endorsement of the message by the government.4 5  In his view,
having a freestanding, unattended structure placed at the actual
seat of government would cause a reasonable observer to believe
the State sponsored and facilitated the message. Justice Stevens
39. Id. at 780-81.
40. Id. at 780.
41. Id. at 782.
42. Id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. Id. Justice Stevens gives the example that "[a] person who views an
exotic cow at the zoo as a symbol of the Government's approval of the Hindu
religion cannot survive this test." Id.
45. Id. at 801-02.
46. Id. at 802.
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disagreed that a reasonable observer knows the law regarding the
permissibility of displays on public grounds4 7 or the history of
Capitol Square. 4 He noted, "[m]any (probably most) reasonable
people do not know the difference between a 'public forum,' a
'limited public forum,' and a 'nonpublic forum.' ' 49 He argued that
adopting such a fiction will detrimentally affect "passersby,
including schoolchildren, traveling salesmen, and tourists" who do
not have this knowledge.:
C. The Lower Courts
The confusion surrounding the definition of a reasonable
observer has resulted in inconsistent decisions among the lower
courts and even within individual circuits." For example, the Third
47. Id. at 804 n.7.
48. Id. at 808.
49. Id. at 807. "Traditional public forums are those places that 'have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions."' Matthew D. McGill, Note,
Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional
Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REV. 929, 933 (2000) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). This category includes
"streets and parks" and "sidewalks and the curtilage around state capitols and
town halls." Id. "In Perry and subsequent cases .... designated public forums
- those that were set aside for a particular purpose, subject, or class of speaker
- were called limited public forums." Id. at 935. "The non-public forum is the
default categorization of public property. If government property is open
neither by tradition nor designation, then it is classified as a non-public
forum." Id.
50. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 808 n.14.
51. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text; see also Kreisner v. City
of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding a Christmas display in
a public park because "the reasonable observer is aware of Balboa Park's
public forum nature and City's first-come, first-served permit policy. Our
observer realizes that the Park... host[s] an eclectic range of uses throughout
the year"); Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to consider the "historical significance" of a municipality's display of
a cross in a city park); Kong v. City & County of San Francisco, 18 Fed. Appx.
616, 618 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting language from a ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that discussed the perceptions of a
"reasonable but unknowledgeable observer") (emphasis added).
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Circuit appeared to adopt Justice Stevens' definition of a
reasonable observer in a case involving the display of a creche and
menorah on the City Hall plaza.52 In defending the display, the City
argued that the informed reasonable observer would know of the
City's year-long celebration of different cultures and religions and
therefore not view the display as endorsing religion.53 The Third
Circuit rejected Justice O'Connor's supposition that a reasonable
observer would be aware of "'history and context' when viewing a
municipality's religious display.54 Characterizing such knowledge as
"a view that departs from reality," the Third Circuit adopted a
passerby definition and concluded: "A general awareness of the
City's celebration of diversity throughout the year is obscured by
the physical presence of the symbols of Christianity and Judaism
before City Hall."55
Later developments in the same case, however, indicated
that the Third Circuit was retreating from its previous position on
what constitutes a reasonable observer.56 After losing the case in
1995, the City modified its display to contain a creche, menorah,
Christmas tree, Santa Claus, Frosty, a sled, and Kwanzaa symbols
on the tree.7 In addition, the City posted signs that explained this
display was part of a series of displays that celebrated different
cultures and ethnic diversity. 8 In upholding the constitutionality of
this display, the Third Circuit revisited the reasonable observer
issue.59 This time the Third Circuit adopted Justice O'Connor's
definition, holding that "'the history and ubiquity' of a practice is
relevant because it provides part of the context in which a
reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental
practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion. '' 0
52. ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1448 (3d Cir. 1997).
53. Id. at 1447-48.
54. Id. at 1448.
55. Id. at 1449.
56. ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 106 (3d Cir. 1999).
57. Id. at 95.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 106-07.
60. Id.
2006] THE REASONABLE OBSERVER
The inconsistencies in the Third Circuit's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence also appear in sister circuits with panels
adopting different approaches. 6' Although it appears most circuits
are adopting the O'Connor definition, this approach is not without
critics. For example, the reasonable observer definition is criticized
when it appears to require omniscience instead of just knowledge. 62
In ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board,
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Ohio's motto "With
God All Things Are Possible." 63 Writing for the majority, Judge
Nelson took issue with the dissenters' opinion that Ohio's motto
was unconstitutional since sister circuits had previously upheld the
constitutionality of the similar national motto "In God We Trust."
64
Specifically, the majority held that a reasonable observer "may well
be" one who is knowledgeable about the Christian Bible and the
New Testament. 65 Judge Nelson would not require the reasonable
observer to have "an encyclopedic knowledge" of the Old and New
Testaments. 66 The inherent vagaries associated with the reasonable
observer test in current First Amendment jurisprudence does not
provide any clear guidance to courts regarding this fundamental
freedom of the non-Establishment of religion.
61. For an excellent summary of cases adopting Justice O'Connor's
approach, see Julie Van Groningen, Note, Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on its
Context: Analyzing Public Displays of the Ten Commandments, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 219, 238-41 (2004). However, courts have refused to adopt this
approach. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir.
1995) ("[A]n appeal to history... is indeed an argument which could always
'trump' the Establishment Clause, because of the undeniable significance of
religion and religious symbols in the history of many of our communities.");
Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1415 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1229 (1992) (striking a city seal containing Christian symbols and
concluding that "[njo appeal to history can abate [a sectarian] message when
the images in the seal are abstract symbols of a particular Christian sect").
62. ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 302
(6th Cir. 2001).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 301.
65. Id. at 303.
66. Id. at 302-03; see also Richard F. Suhrheinrich & T. Melindah Bush,
The Ohio Motto Survives the Establishment Clause, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 585, 590-
601, 607-12 (2003).
149
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II. TEN COMMANDMENT CASES
The confusion surrounding the reasonable observer
definition and religious displays is no less with cases involving
displays of religious text. Decisions both upholding and
overturning Ten Commandment displays have only added to the
confusion.
A. History
Until 2005, the Supreme Court had considered only one Ten
Commandments case, Stone v. Graham.67 Stone also originated
from Kentucky and centered around the Decalogue being posted
on the walls of classrooms in public schools. 68 A Kentucky statute
mandated the posting of the Ten Commandments along with a
small print notation explaining the purpose of the display below the
last Commandment. 69 The notation stated: "The secular application
of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common
Law of the United States."7" Deciding the case without briefs or
oral arguments, the Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion
that the statute violated the Establishment Clause because it had no
secular purpose.' Neither the private funding of the display nor the
required notation regarding the purpose negated the religious
nature of the Ten Commandments." The Court did leave open the
possibility that the Ten Commandments could be displayed if they
were integrated into the school curriculum and "used in an
appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative
religion, or the like.
'73
Since 1980, lower courts have reviewed the constitutionality
of Ten Commandment displays on numerous occasions and there is
67. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 39-40.
69. Id. at 40 n.1.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 41.
72. Id. at 41-42.
73. Id. at 42.
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no consensus among the circuits regarding the permissibility of
these displays under the First Amendment.74 In the seven circuits
that have addressed the issue, three have ruled the displays
unconstitutional, 75 and five have upheld the constitutionality of the
76displays, with the Seventh Circuit being in both categories. What
make the cases so interesting are not necessarily the results, but
rather the logic underlying the results. Many times the seeming
exact same factor - location of the display on a courthouse lawn, for
example - is used to infer whether or not a reasonable observer
would perceive government endorsement with completely opposite
results. For example, the Fifth Circuit held a Ten Commandments
monument placed on the grounds between a state's legislative,
executive, and judicial buildings would allow a reasonable observer
to see the Decalogue's connection with the law, and therefore
would not be considered a religious endorsement.77 In contrast, the
74. See William M. Howard, Annotation, First Amendment Challenges to
Display of Religious Symbols on Public Property, 107 A.L.R. 23 (2003). The
Seventh Circuit has held both ways on this issue. Compare Ind. Civil Liberties
Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Ten
Commandments monument on state grounds violated the Establishment
Clause) with Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding
the Ten Commandments displayed with other patriotic documents).
75. See ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003);
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a monument
engraved with the Ten Commandments in an Alabama State Judicial Building
violated Establishment Clause); Ind. Civil Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259
F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001); Books v. City of Elkhart Indiana, 235 F.3d 292 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a city's display of a monument inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the lawn of a municipal building violated the
Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001).
76. See Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005); Van
Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003); Freethought Soc'y. v. Chester
County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding an eighty-two year-old
plaque); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973)
(upholding an illuminated monolith of the Ten Commandments as serving a
primarily secular purpose); see also ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of
Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding originally that the Ten
Commandments display at city park violated the Establishment Clause, but
reversing on rehearing en banc).
77. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 543
U.S. 923 (2004).
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Seventh Circuit held a reasonable observer would perceive
endorsement when a monument is placed at the seat of government
on grounds containing the Capitol, the Governor's office, the
General Assembly, the Indiana Supreme Court, and the Indiana
Court of Appeals.
Lower courts struggle in their analysis if they concentrate
on the age of the display. In reversing the district court, the Third
Circuit held that a reasonable observer would perceive an eighty-
two year-old plaque containing the Ten Commandments as the
government's attempt to preserve a longstanding fixture on a
historical monument and would not be a religious endorsement.
79
Additionally, an Eighth Circuit panel decision finding that a thirty-
five year old monument was a religious endorsement was later
overruled en banc.8° These examples exemplify the inconsistencies
in lower courts resulting from the reasonable observer test and
demonstrate the need for a change in how these cases are
analyzed." Hoping for clarifications and more guidance, lower
courts, scholars, local government officials, and would-be plaintiffs
anxiously awaited the Supreme Court decisions from the Spring
2005 Term.
B. McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky
Kentucky's latest Ten Commandments controversy arose
when county officials simply posted a version of the Ten
Commandments in a high traffic area of the McCreary County
Courthousel The display's alleged purpose was to teach citizens
about "American religious history" and to show "America's
78. Ind. Civ. Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir.
2001).
79. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 264, 270 (3d Cir.
2003).
80. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020, 1039 (8th
Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 419 F.3d 772, 774-75 (8th Cir. 2005).
81. See infra Part IV.
82. ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 441-42 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
Another display occurred in the Pulaski County courthouse and the two cases
were ultimately joined. This Article focuses on the facts of McCreary County.
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Christian heritage."' The ACLU sued the County, asserting that
the posting of the Ten Commandments violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.84 In response to the suit,
county officials modified the display by adding excerpts from
various historical documents, each one included for its reference to
religion. 8' Not satisfied that this cured the Establishment Clause
violation, the ACLU proceeded with its lawsuit and a federal
district court granted the ACLU's request for a preliminary
injunction, ordering county officials to remove the display.8
District Court Judge Coffman, applying the Lemon test,
determined that the display violated the purpose and effects prong
and thus concluded that the ACLU was likely to succeed on the
merits of the case.87
McCreary County first appealed the decision, but later
voluntarily dismissed the appeal and filed a motion asking the
District Court Judge to clarify her order.8 Judge Coffman denied
that motion and the County posted yet another display. 89 This third
attempt was entitled "Foundations of American Law and
Government," and its alleged purpose was to educate county
residents about the impact various historical documents had on the
foundation of our laws.90 The documents were all the same size,
83. ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 686 (6th Cir. 2000).
84. McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 440.
85. Id. at 442. The second display included all or parts of eight
documents: an excerpt from the Declaration of Independence; the Preamble
to the Constitution of Kentucky; the national motto of the United States ("In
God We Trust"); a page from the Congressional Record declaring 1983 the
Year of the Bible (which included a copy of the Ten Commandments); an
1863 proclamation by President Lincoln declaring April 30, 1863, a National
Day of Prayer and Humiliation; an excerpt from President Lincoln's "Reply to
Loyal Colored People of Baltimore upon Presentation of a Bible" reading,
"The Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man"; a proclamation by
President Reagan marking 1983 as the Year of the Bible; and the Mayflower
Compact. Id.
86. Id. at 444.
87. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 682, 685.
88. McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 441.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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framed identically,9 and included the following: the King James
version of the Ten Commandments with a citation to Exodus 20:3-
17;92 the Magna Carta; the Declaration of Independence; the Bill of
Rights of the U.S. Constitution; the Star-Spangled Banner; the
national motto emblem, "In God We Trust," along with the
preamble to the Constitution of Kentucky; the Mayflower Compact
of 1620; a picture of Lady Justice; and a prefatory document
explaining the significance of each symbol. 93 The explanatory text
for the Ten Commandments indicated that:
The Ten Commandments have profoundly
influenced the formation of Western legal
thought and the formation of our country.
That influence is clearly seen in the Declaration
of Independence, which declared that, "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness." The Ten
Commandments provide the moral background
of the Declaration of Independence and the
foundation of our legal tradition. 94
The ACLU then asked the court to either extend the
preliminary injunction or find the County in contempt.95 Judge
Coffman extended the preliminary injunction holding that the
twice-amended display failed the Lemon test since it lacked a
secular purpose and would have the effect of advancing religion.9
McCreary County appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit which
affirmed and refused a rehearing en banc. 97 The Supreme Court
91. Id. at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 444. The citation was later voluntarily removed. Id.
93. Id. at 443.
94. Id.
95. ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (E.D. Ky.
2001). affid, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003).
96. Id. at 851-53.
97. ACLU v. McCreary County, 361 F.3d 928, 928 (6th Cir. 2004), affd,
125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
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granted certiorari on several issues including whether the Lemon
test should be overruled and whether the prior displays tainted the
present display.98
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Souter refused
to either eliminate the Lemon test or revise it by removing the
purpose prong as recommended by the Kentucky government
officials.99 Holding purpose still extremely relevant in
Establishment Clause enquiries,0 Justice Souter acknowledged the
important role purpose plays in statutory construction and other
constitutional issues.1°'  Having retained the purpose prong,
' °2
Justice Souter refused to accept the officials' argument that the
secular purpose articulated for the third display erased the previous
sectarian purposes of the prior two displays.' 3  Although
historically giving great deference to legislatures, the Court
required more than a sham purpose and would not abandon its role
in analyzing whether a truly secular purpose existed for a
government's actions. '°  Part of that analysis required the Court to
98. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005).
99. Id. at 2734. The purpose prong is criticized because true purpose is
unknowable, leading to opposite results for identical displays solely focusing
on expressed motives. Displays are upheld when savvy officials either are
mute or express secular motives while displays are ruled unconstitutional
when religious motives are expressed. A problem exists also in determining
whose motives matter and how long an improper motive can taint future
displays. See infra Part III.A.
A real life example of this can be found in the recent Sixth Circuit
decision to uphold a display absolutely identical to the display at issue in
McCreary County, except that there was no extensive legislative history of
prior displays or religious statements from government officials. ACLU v.
Mercer County, 432 F.3d 624, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 28072 at ['19-211 (6th
Cir. 2005).
100. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor also finds purpose relevant:
"The purpose behind the counties' display is relevant because it conveys an
unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer." McCreary
County, 125 S. Ct. at 2747 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 2734.
102. Id. at 2735-36.
103. Id. at 2736-37.
104. Id. at 2735.
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be cognizant of the history of the display and its impact on current
circumstances.' 05
In addition, the items in the display failed to dilute the
County's impermissible sectarian purpose.106 Justice Souter found
no clear theme among the posted materials.' 7 He characterized as
odd the inclusion of a patriotic anthem to the exclusion of the
Fourteenth Amendment since that amendment was "the most
significant structural provision adopted since the original
Framing."'0 8 He surmised that a reasonable observer would be
"baffl[ed]," "perplex[ed]," and "puzzled" and would conclude the
government had included unrelated documents as a guise to keep
the Ten Commandments posted."
Justice Souter also spent considerable space discussing the
government's obligation to be neutral, except for limited
circumstances, regarding issues of religion."0  This neutrality
concept underpinning the Establishment Clause prevents the
government from endorsing one religion over another or religion
over non-religion."' Moreover, the neutrality concept prevents the
government from taking sides on contested issues of religion.1
Recognizing the posting of the Ten Commandments as being one of
these controversial issues, he found that county officials crossed the
neutrality line when they posted a Christian version of a sacred
text."3 Thus, the Court held that the display failed the purpose
prong of the Lemon test."4 Because no clear secular theme existed
that would prevail over the religious purpose, the Court affirmed
the Sixth Circuit's decision to uphold the preliminary injunction. I'
In a stinging dissent, often questioning and criticizing his
colleagues by name, Justice Scalia vehemently disagreed with
105. Id.




110. Id. at 2742.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2739, 2745.
114. Id. at 2745.
115. Id.
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interpreting the Establishment Clause as requiring neutrality
between religion and non-religion. ' 1 Instead of neutrality, he
argued the framers intended the Clause to allow activities that pay
tribute to God and religion. '  He concluded that this
accommodation was intended even if it focuses on monolithic
religions."8 For support, he referenced early presidential writings
and speeches in which God is mentioned. ' 9 As in prior cases, he
attacked the Lemon test, in particular the purpose prong, and
argued that the Court has had no consistent approach to its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.2 0 After considering both of
the 2005 Ten Commandment cases, Justice Scalia concluded that
"there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion
generally, honoring God through public prayer and
acknowledgment, or, in a non-proselytizing manner, venerating the
Ten Commandments."'
121
C. Van Orden v. Perry
The second Ten Commandments case of the Spring 2005
Term involved a much older display erected in 1961 on the grounds
122
of the Texas State Capitol. Here, the Decalogue was carved on a
116. Id. at 2750-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. Examples of these activities include: "so help me God" in
presidential oaths, opening Supreme Court sessions with a prayer, and
references to God on our coins and in our Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 2750.
118. Id. at 2753 n.3.
119. Id. at 2748-49, 2753 (referencing President Washington's
Thanksgiving Proclamation, various inaugural addresses, and a letter from
John Adams).
120. Id. at 2757-58.
121. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Scalia takes issue with the supposed underlying premise of
neutrality embodied in the Lemon test and would eliminate the purpose
prong. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In fact, Scalia would abandon the entire Lemon test, which he
perceives as hostile to religion, and instead find actions constitutional that are
based on longstanding traditions. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2864. This case was argued on the same
day as McCreary County.
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granite monument about six feet high and three and one-half feet
wide to honor the Fraternal Order of Eagles' efforts on behalf of
youths.'2 This monument is similar to many others donated during
the 1950s and 1960s across the United States.12 Besides the two
tablets containing the Ten Commandments, the monument also
included "an eagle grasping an American flag, an eye inside a
pyramid, two small stars of David, two superimposed Greek letters
representing Christ, and an inscription noting that it was donated
by the Fraternal Order of Eagles. 1 25  The text of theS• 126
Commandments is larger than any of the other symbols. The
monument is one of seventeen other statues, monuments and
commemoratives that pay tribute to the "people, ideals and events"
127
of Texas' history, 1 yet it is the only monument that contains
religious text. 18  The monuments closest to the Ten
Commandments are tributes to the women and children of Texas
and several others honor various war veterans.129
In contrast to the Kentucky display at issue in McCreary,
little legislative history exists explaining why the monument was
installed. '3° A resolution at the time of the installation indicates
that in addition to honoring the Fraternal Order of Eagles' efforts,
123. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2003).
124. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2877 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In 1990, the
monument was removed during a restoration project but was reinstalled in
1993 at the same location. Respondent's Brief at 14, Van Orden v. Perry, 125
S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (No. 03-1500).
125. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858.
126. Id. (noting that the primary content of the monolith was the text of
the Ten Commandments).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2858 n.1 ("Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Brigade,
Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas
Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard, Ten
Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Woman,
The Boy Scouts' Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean
War Veterans, Soldiers of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace
Officers.").
129. Id.; see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 124, at 3.
130. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858 (noting that the "legislative record
surrounding the State's acceptance of the monument from the Eagles ... is
limited to legislative journal entries").
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the monument was established to promote morality and the
prevention of juvenile delinquency." ' Another implicit reason,
mentioned in the government's brief, is to acknowledge the historic
role of the Ten Commandments in American culture and law.1
32
The District Court, finding no constitutional violation,
granted summary judgment to the government and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.33 The fact that the monument stood on the Capitol
grounds with seventeen other monuments for forty-two years
before being challenged was particularly compelling to the court.'
34
Additionally, the court found that the placement of this monument
between the legislative, executive, and judicial buildings would
indicate to a reasonable observer that there was a connection
between the Decalogue and "law-giving instruments of State
government.'
35
Reaching a different result from McCreary, a plurality of
the Supreme Court held that the Texas monument was
constitutional. 36 In announcing the judgment, Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged the Court's duty to maintain a division between
church and state while at the same time avoiding being hostile to
religion.37 Calling the Texas monument a passive display, Justice
Rehnquist determined the Lemon test to be unhelpful.' 38 Although
recognizing the monument had religious significance, Justice
Rehnquist placed it with other acceptable acknowledgements of
religion. 39  He cited detailed examples of past governmental
recognition of the role of God in our Nation's heritage, including
President Washington's Thanksgiving Day Proclamation, legislative
131. Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. Respondent's Brief, supra note 124, at 32-36.
133. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 2003). The District
Court accepted the State's secular purpose as recognizing the Eagles' work
with youth and found that a reasonable observer mindful of the history,
purpose, and context, would not conclude that the monument violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 179.
134. Id. at 181.
135. Id.
136. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2858.
137. Id. at 2859.
138. Id. at 2861.
139. Id. at 2863.
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prayers, and religious content on buildings and monuments.'
°
Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Texas monument from prayers
or Ten Commandment displays in schools, finding it to be more
passive than what is confronted by public schoolchildren.
4
'
Justice Breyer, the swing vote, declined to apply the Lemon
test and instead endorsed using legal judgment as the best standard
rather than relying on any particular test. 42  Calling this a
"borderline case," he concluded that the State intended the
nonreligious aspects of the monument to predominate.14 For
support, he relied on the Fraternal Order of Eagles' efforts to select
a nonsectarian text and the physical setting of the monument on a
non-sacred site.'" In addition, he found it very determinative that
no challenge had been brought against this monument for over
forty years. 4  Based on this, he concluded that "this display is
unlikely to prove divisive. '"'46
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he took
issue with the Court's continual reliance on the "unusually
informed observer.', 7  He argued that a reasonable observer
analysis failed to satisfy either the adherents or the non-adherents
by failing to give their views proper weight.'48 In addition, Justice
Thomas noted that the reasonable observer analysis "provides no
principled way to choose between those views" and that the
adoption of a coercion test would likely avoid this dilemma.'
In writing one of the dissents, Justice Stevens concluded
that "[t]he sole function of the monument on the grounds of Texas'
State Capitol is to display the full text of one version of the Ten
140. Id. at 2861-63.
141. Id. at 2861 (noting that for passive displays, such as the Texas
monument at issue, "our analysis is driven both by the nature of the
monument and by our Nation's history").
142. Id. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
143. Id. at 2869-70.
144. Id. at 2870.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2871.
147. Id. at 2867 (Thomas, J., concurring).
14& Id.
149. Id. at 2867.
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Commandments."'5 As a result, Justice Stevens refused to accept
the plurality's characterization of the case as about "historic
preservation or the mere recognition of religion."'' In addition, he
objected to the use of a venerable religious text to achieve a secular
goal of reducing juvenile delinquency.'52 Justice Stevens also took
issue with the plurality's reliance on religious statements and
proclamations of our Nation's leaders.' He distinguished these
actions from a permanent display of religious text since the former
contained personal views of the speakers.'54 Finally, Justice Stevens
reaffirmed his commitment to the neutrality principle which, in his
mind, prohibits the choice of one version of the Decalogue over
another since that choice "invariably places the State at the center
of a serious sectarian dispute.
' 155
Although it was surprising that Justice Breyer became the
swing vote between the two decisions instead of Justice O'Connor
as many anticipated, the bigger surprise came from Justice Stevens.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens joined with the other Justices'
description of a more knowledgeable observer, instead of using his
previous passerby definition.'5 6  Justice Stevens had criticized
Justice O'Connor's "well-schooled jurist" reasonable observer
model in previous cases.5 7  Yet, in McCreary County, Justice
Stevens joined a majority opinion full of references to an observer
who is "acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute.',5  This approach even contrasts
with his dissent in Van Orden, in which he spent a considerable
amount of time tracing the history and original purpose of the
display donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, all of which a
150. Id. at 2873 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2876.
152. Id. at 2878.
153. Id. at 2882-90.
154. Id. at 2883.
155. Id. at 2880.
156. Capitol Square v. Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id; see also, supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
158. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735 (2005) (quoting
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)).
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"passerby" would not know.5 9 Only once did he seem to limit the
reasonable observer's knowledge, opining that an observer would
not know the particulars about the selected version of the Ten
Commandments.' 6°
Of course, Justice Stevens voted to strike down the
McCreary County display since he believes the Establishment
Clause creates "a strong presumption against the display of
religious symbols on public property.' 6 Yet it seems curious that
he did not write a concurrence, agreeing in result only, opining that
a reasonable observer would not require all this background
knowledge to conclude that the display's content and context have
the effect of endorsing religion. As he discussed, its placement at
the seat of government and its text which commands a preference
162to religion over non-religion are enough. Knowing the prior
history of the display in Kentucky or the way the monument came
to be in Texas is really unnecessary to the analysis if Justice Stevens
held true to his definition of a reasonable observer as a mere
passerby. Unfortunately, he seems to have either abandoned this
approach to join the others who create fictions of what an observer
knows, or only diverged because of the obvious legislative purpose
on the record in McCreary. Regardless of the reason, adhering to
his passerby definition would have been better for the development
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence which already is riddled with
more than its share of inconsistencies.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE REASONABLE OBSERVER ISSUE
FRAMEWORK
Serious problems exist when trying to use the reasonable
observer framework to analyze Lemon's purpose and effect prongs
in sacred text cases. When analyzing the first prong, the
government's purpose, the fiction of a reasonable observer requires
the hypothetical observer to know much more than an actual
159. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2877-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2880.
161. Id. at 2874.
162. Id.
2006] THE REASONABLE OBSERVER
observer knows. Most observers will not know the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute, especially if the display
is old. In addition, the reasonable observer framework offers no
help when legislative history is absent or inconclusive.
Moreover, this framework is also flawed when used to
determine the second prong, the effect the display has on a
reasonable observer. For example, when determining whether a
reasonable observer would conclude a sufficient connection exists
between the Ten Commandments and the rest of the display, the
court looks not just to the display itself but imputes other
knowledge to a reasonable observer. A normal observer would not
have this additional information. Besides the obvious fiction that a
normal observer has all of this knowledge, this method will only
work if there is agreement regarding what it is the reasonable
observer must know. Absent such agreement, a judge must decide
between competing theories. A local judge would tend to favor the
majority position especially in areas such as this where there are
religious overtones. 163 Instead of maintaining neutrality, this forces
the government to choose sides.
A. Problems with a Reasonable Observer's Knowledge of Purpose
Based on its current definition, a reasonable observer
knows more about the government's motivations than an actual
observer. The fictions of what a reasonable observer knows are a
byproduct of allowing knowledge to be based on extrinsic evidence,
i.e., evidence other than what is present at the site of the display.
Problems will naturally occur when state officials are allowed to
justify the displays by their word alone and/or by digging into
decades-old legislative history. Critics of this approach argue that a
government's endorsement should not be rebuttable by the oral
testimony of government officials claiming private intentions, or by
historic claims buried in the archives. It should not be rebuttable
163. Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, The Politics of Religion
and The Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 517 (1992)
("Judges are themselves acculturated to a set of perspectives that are
emphatically not the perspectives of outsiders.").
163
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by claims of subtle secular messages that can be ferreted out only
with effort that exceeds what is required to see the explicit message
on the face of the display. When courts entertain evidence of
offsite explanations or subtly implied secular messages, they invite
sham claims of secular purpose and effect.I64
These fictions significantly impacted the most recent
Supreme Court cases. The first fiction was that a reasonable
observer in Kentucky had knowledge of the origins of the prior
displays and the previous litigation associated with them. Crediting
observers with such knowledge was particularly important to the
case's outcome because it bolstered the argument that the final
display disguised a sham purpose. Without such knowledge, a
reasonable observer would be far less likely to perceive the display
unconstitutional, at least on purpose grounds. But with such
knowledge, altering a religious display to make it constitutional
may be nearly impossible, as a reasonable observer would then
assume that the message remained the same and that the secular
objects were added only to make the display constitutional.
Practical problems exist, too, if the court adopts an
approach in which a reasonable observer has knowledge of prior
unconstitutional displays which taints his/her perception of future
ones. Specifically, how long would the taint last - one year? Five
years? Forever? According to Justice Souter, a reasonable
observer has a "reasonable memory" but surely even he does not
think these memories last for eternity.16 1 Justice Scalia speculates
that in actuality the majority of people will not be familiar at all
with the resolutions authorizing the display. ' 66
164. Brief of Baptist Joint Committee and The Interfaith Alliance
Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, Van Orden v.
Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (No. 03-1500) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief of
Baptist Joint Committee]. Much has been written criticizing the use of
legislative history characterizing sources of legislative history as being easily
manipulated and untrustworthy. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Observations
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 Duke L.J. 371 (1987).
165. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2737. Justice Souter emphasized
that "we do not decide that the Counties' past actions forever taint any effort
on their part to deal with the subject matter." Id. at 2741. Despite saying this,
he offers no guidance on when that may be.
166. Id. at 2763.
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Moreover, the reasonable observer framework breaks down
when no legislative history exists or when it is inconclusive or
incomplete. A presumption of proper purpose should not result
from the simple or perhaps orchestrated absence of facts. For
example, little legislative history existed in the Texas case since the
monument was so old.' 67 One should not assume, however, that the
government's purpose was necessarily secular. Nor should a secular
purpose be presumed with newer displays where governmental
officials are careful to avoid any mention of religion. The purpose
inquiry drives courts to reach opposite results when one
government official has been counseled not to reveal the true illegal
purpose while another carelessly voices or politically exploits the
religiously motivated purpose. Consistency in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence will never be achieved if decisions turn on
such a flimsy distinction.
Justice Scalia acknowledged this real flaw in his McCreary
dissent by pointing to the nonsensical result that identical displays
in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Indiana would not all be
constitutional.'6 These inconsistencies occur, at least in large
measure, because of the reliance on the reasonable observer's
knowledge of the events leading up to the displays, including
knowledge of legislative history. Scalia succinctly writes:
Displays erected in silence (and under the
direction of good legal advice) are permissible,
while those hung after discussion and debate
are deemed unconstitutional. Reduction of the
Establishment Clause to such minutiae
trivializes the Clause's protection against
religious establishment; indeed, it may inflame
religious passions by making the passing
comments of every government official the
.. . t69
subject of endless litigation.
167. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 176.
168. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2761 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
165
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B. Problems with the Effect on a Reasonable Observer
The flaws associated with the reasonable observer
framework are no less apparent in analyses of the Lemon test's
effect prong. Crediting a reasonable observer with sufficient
knowledge about the origins of American law so that a secular
connection can be identified between the Ten Commandments and
the display's political and patriotic documents is unrealistic. In the
2001 U.S. History Assessment developed by the National
Assessment Governing Board, fifty-seven percent of high school
seniors fell below "basic," an achievement level that denotes only
partial mastery of significant historical knowledge and analytical
skills.1 7° In a different survey only forty-six percent of the 800 adult
Americans surveyed could identify Washington as the general who
led the Continental Army to victory in the Revolutionary War.
1 71
Other studies show one in five high-school seniors thought
Germany was a U.S. ally during World War II and one in four
eighth-graders did not know why the Civil War was fought. Such
a documented lack of knowledge of basic history among Americans
makes imputing knowledge of the origins of American law to a
reasonable observer an absurd fiction.
The level of knowledge imputed to a reasonable observer is
further complicated by the inherent bias as to what the knowledge
should be. For example, a raging debate exists between scholars as
to the extent the Ten Commandments influenced American law or
whether the Enlightenment philosophies played a greater role.
73
170. Press Release, Nat'l. Assessment Governing Bd., Statement on
NAEP 2001 U.S. History Report Card (May 9, 2002), available at
http://www.nagb.org/naep/history-ravitch.html.
171. Press Release, C.V. Starr Ctr. for the Study of the Am. Experience,
Which George W. Would Americans Elect? (Feb. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.washcoll.edu/wc/news/press-releases/05 02_16&washington-poll.ht
ml
172. See Press Release, President Introduces History & Civic Educ.
Initiatives (September 17, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/09/20020917-1.html.
173. Steven K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten
Commandments As A Source of American Law, 14 J. L. & RELIGION, 525,555-
58 (1999-2000).
2006] THE REASONABLE OBSERVER
Because no definitive answer exists as to whether there is even a
connection between the Ten Commandments and historical
documents such as the Declaration of Independence, it is
impossible to effectively analyze whether a reasonable observer
would make a connection, perceiving either a secular message of
patriotism or one of endorsement. In situations like this, when no
agreement exists regarding history, the reasonable observer
framework offers no help to the courts.
As a result, judges are forced to choose among one of these
competing scholarly theories which necessarily violates the
Establishment Clause's mandate that the government remain
neutral and not take sides over religious debates. 74 Critics of the
reasonable observer framework suggest this choice often favors the
majority position.'75 By basing the reasonable observer on a
community ideal, courts run the danger of dismissing viewpoints
that belong to a minority of the community.176 In addition, the
fiction of the reasonable observer having knowledge and
understanding of the policies and practices of the government only
intensifies the problem since these policies and procedures
originated from the majority.177 That is, a display, practice, or
symbol may be ubiquitous because it originates from a dominant,
majority religion.78  If this is the case, the value underlying the
174. Brief of Baptist Joint Committee et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 15, McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No.
03-1693) ("Government discussions of religion must be religiously neutral, and
in general, that will mean that government must confine itself to objective
facts, readily verified. When government makes evaluative claims about a
particular sacred text, it is taking sides in a religious controversy.").
175. Charles Gregory Warren, Comment, No Need To Stand on
Ceremony: The Corruptive Influence of Ceremonial Deism and the Need For
A Separationist Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1692-93 (2003).
176. Id. at n.197.
177. Samuel J. Levine, Toward A Religious Minority Voice: A Look At
Free Exercise Law Through A Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 153, 154 (1996).
178. Benjamin I. Sachs, Case Note, Whose Reasonableness Counts?, 107
YALE L.J. 1523 n.24 (1998) (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Participation in Public Programs, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 148 (1992) (arguing
167
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Establishment Clause to protect religious minorities is effectivelyS 179
turned upside down.
Giving weight to the religious atmosphere of a particular
community increases the danger that minorities' concerns will be
dismissed. Critics have warned that non-adherents would be shut
out using the community ideal framework. Moreover, defining the
community ideal of reasonable behavior by the "collective social
judgment" is impossible in a religious arena.'8 An observer's
perception of what is reasonable changes depending on whether
. . 181
that observer is an atheist, Buddhist, or a Christian. Although a
reasonable observer framework may be effective for analyzing tort,
contract, and criminal law issues, it is not particularly effective in
this arena because uniformity of beliefs do not exist between
religions.8 2 Since no collective social judgment about religious
matters exists, the tendency to analyze the cases based on the
desired outcome or a majority perspective is a real danger.
C. Problems in Application to Specific Cases
This danger materialized in the cases before the Court this
term with the Justices reaching opposite conclusions regarding the
effect the content had on a reasonable observer. In McCreary
County, the Court held that the government highlighted the Ten
Commandments by placing them in a context with unrelated
secular documents causing a reasonable observer to infer a national1 183
significance and thus endorsement. In purported contrast, a
plurality in Van Orden found that the placement of the Ten
Commandments among sixteen other monuments that
commemorated Texas history was not unconstitutional since a
that "widespread acceptance of religious symbols indicates only the
'dominance of certain religions"')).
179. Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The Supreme Court's Coercion Test:
Insufficient Constitutional Protection For America's Religious Minorities, 11
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 245, 257 (2001).
180. Capitol Square v. Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. 753, 799 n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Groningen, supra note 61, at 233 n.64.
182. Id.
183. 125 S. Ct. at 2731 n.7.
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reasonable viewer would see the monument as an acknowledgment
of the large role the Decalogue has played in America's heritage.1
8
4
Consequently, this caused the Court to reach different conclusions
as to whether a reasonable observer would identify the common
theme of the development of American law when viewing the
Decalogue and the surrounding items. The connection was
apparent in Texas, but not in Kentucky.
These findings seem somewhat counterintuitive since
McCreary County at least tried to connect the items with an
explanatory plaque describing the display, while the state of Texas
did not. The only plaque at the site of the Texas monument bore
the inscription "PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND YOUTH
OF TEXAS BY THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF
TEXAS 1961. " 185 These inconsistent findings vividly illustrate the
flawed reasonable observer framework and its reliance on pure
fictions.
In addition, although not an integral part of the Supreme
Court's opinions, the Sixth and Fifth Circuit courts reached
opposite conclusions regarding the impact of the displays' location
on a reasonable observer. The Sixth Circuit held that placing the
display on the Kentucky courthouse walls caused a reasonable
observer to infer approval since anything "posted at the seat of
government . . . 'is so plainly under government ownership and
control... .""86 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found the placement of
the monument between the Texas Capitol, the Governor's office,
and Supreme Court building strengthened the legal, secular
connection since its location made it "plainly linked with those
houses of the law.' 7 Other courts across the country have likewise
reached polar opposite conclusions when addressing the relevance
of the display's location9
184. Id. at 2877.
185. Id. at 2858.
186. ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 461 (6th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000)).
187. Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 2003).
18& See Howard, supra note 74 (summarizing cases involving First
Amendment challenges to displays of religious symbols and conflicting
results).
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One significant distinction, at least for Justice Breyer, was
the age of the displays, with McCreary County's being brand new
and the Texas monument being forty-two years old."89 Although
the Texas monument at issue in Van Orden actually had its date
posted, many times a reasonable observer could only know the age
of a display if that knowledge was imputed to him. Therefore, most
observers will probably not know the age of the display forcing
courts to create yet another fiction to find such knowledge.
Even if an observer knew the age of a display, the relevance
of that knowledge is questionable on two counts. First, simply
because a display is old does not mean it is constitutional, as the
Court has acknowledged: "[N]o one acquires a vested or protected
right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that
span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed
predates it." '90 Thus, the mere fact that no challenges have been
brought against a display should not determine its constitutionality.
Although not claiming the age of a display to be totally irrelevant,
Justice Souter in his dissent does not agree that forty years without
a challenge means the display should stand.19' While acknowledging
that many explanations could exist for the lack of a challenge,
Justice Souter doubted "that a slow walk to the courthouse, even
one that took 40 years, is much evidentiary help in applying the
Establishment Clause."'2 Second, even if the Court made the age
of a display a significant factor in its analysis, judges need more
guidance as to what length of time gives rise to a presumption of
constitutionality. From these two cases we can surmise forty-two
years is enough but two years is not enough. Is thirty years old
enough? Twenty years? Ten years? The reasonable observer
framework, once again, is unable to provide clarity.
189. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2870-71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
190. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678
(1970).
191. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Unfortunately, these recent decisions muddied the waters
even more due to the majority's reliance on Lemon's purpose prong
in McCreary County and Justice Breyer's contrasting reliance on
the facts in Van Orden. This continued uncertainty is guaranteed to
spawn more lawsuits as the decisions provided lower courts little
guidance for future holdings and allows for judges' subjective
beliefs about what a reasonable observer does or does not know to
influence Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The relevance of
the Lemon test remains questionable since it was not overruled in
McCreary County but then not used in Van Orden. In addition,
Justice Breyer's opinion seems to "grandfather in" older displays,
but gives no guidance as to how old is old enough.'9 Finally, the
decisions seem to leave open the real possibility of opposite
holdings for identical displays if politicians take the Court's cue and
make no religious references while creating the displays.
In defense of the Justices, the inherent tensions between
acknowledging our Nation's heritage while keeping church and
state separate make for no easy solutions. However, different
guidelines from what the Court has provided will help resolve the
ambiguities and inconsistent applications associated with the
reasonable observer framework. A more uniform pattern to these
cases can be obtained by eliminating the fictions from the analysis.
To this end, future courts must stop imputing knowledge about
legislative history and the age of the display to the reasonable
observer when deciding whether a government action
acknowledges or endorses religion. This change alone will greatly
help to eliminate the problem of opposite results for identical
displays.
A. "Presumption of Unconstitutionality "Test
The Lemon test needs to be revised for sacred text cases.
When sacred text is posted, either by itself or as part of a larger
display, the presumption should be that the purpose is to endorse
193. Id. at 2870-71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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religion. This presumption should apply even if the text has a
secular component because a religious purpose more likely exists
when a government displays sacred text as opposed to a symbol. In
contrast to text, "a symbolic depiction, like tablets with 10 roman
numerals... could be seen as alluding to a general notion of law,
not a sectarian conception of faith."''9  If courts adopt the
presumption that an improper purpose exists when governments
display sacred text, the judges will avoid having to engage in the
impossible task of identifying the purpose underlying these
displays. In addition, this presumption would eliminate the need
for courts to impute knowledge on reasonable observers and
engage in utter fictions. Thus, even if legislative history is silent or
the government officials hide their true religious purpose, an
improper purpose will be assumed unless it can be rebutted.9 '
An amicus brief written by the pre-eminent church-state
scholar, Professor Douglas Laycock, provided three ways to
effectively rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality when using
a sacred text.9 Using these ideas as a basis for my
recommendations, I would propose two broad categories of
displays that might include sacred text yet still be constitutional.
First, a display of sacred text could be constitutional if the
government shows that it fits within a de minimis exception. A
194. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2738 (2005). In their
Amicus Brief in Van Orden, the Baptist Joint Committee and The Interfaith
Alliance Foundation argued that "implicit statements of nonverbal symbols
are more open to interpretation than express statements in words."
Petitioner's Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 164, at 5 n.3. In
contrast, a message, when it is composed of words, has the intended effect for
readers to believe what is stated. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2738.
195. If a plaintiff had actual knowledge of improper purposes, then even
if the presumption can be rebutted there may well still be an Establishment
Clause violation. See supra Part III.A.
196. Petitioner's Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 164, at 24-
30. Professor Laycock, as counsel of record, lists three ways to overcome the
presumption: (1) using sacred text as part of an explicit secular message that is
objectively neutral with respect to the sacred text's content (i.e. display on
history of Jewish people, survey on ancient moral codes); (2) using religious
language in de minimis ways for secular purposes satisfying the ceremonial
deism test developed by Justice O'Connor; (3) using brief quotations from
religious sources with meanings equivalent to secular sentiments. Id.
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display would fit this exception if it expressed a generic reference to
a religious thought in conjunction with a secular or ceremonialS 197
function. The sacred text could not be, however, a complete core
belief or tenet of a particular religion. This exception would allow
such generic religious thoughts as "In God We Trust" on our coins.
In addition, this exception would be broad enough to include brief
quotations from a religious source that have a secular meaning.19"
The second way the State could rebut the presumption of
unconstitutionality is by fitting the display into a narrowly tailored
inclusion category. This exception would require the display of the
sacred text to be narrowly tailored to support the secular theme.
The State would be required to demonstrate a logical connection
between the core religious beliefs or tenets and the surrounding
theme and that connection must be objectively apparent at the site.
Justice Souter justified the Court's decision in McCreary County by
relying on "openly available data [that] supported a commonsense
conclusion that a religious objective permeated the government's
actions.''99 However, most of the openly available data of which
Justice Souter spoke was not at the site of the display. Not
requiring the data to be at the site of the display, but instead
imputing the knowledge of legislative history and implementation
of the statute to a reasonable observer, results in all of the problems
197. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote that:
[I]n a discrete category of cases, [the government can]
acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending
the Constitution. This category of "ceremonial deism"
most clearly encompasses such things as the national
motto ("In God We Trust"), religious references in
traditional patriotic songs such as the Star-Spangled
Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of this
Court opens each of its sessions ("God save the United
States and this honorable Court").
Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989)). The "history, character, and
context [of such examples] prevent them from being constitutional violations
at all." Id.
198. Petitioner's Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 164, at 24-
30.
199. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2735.
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discussed in the previous section of this Article. A better approach
requires analyzing what the observer actual observes from the "four
corners" of the display itself.
The narrowly tailored requirement would sometimes
require that certain portions of the sacred text not be displayed if
those portions do not have a logical connection to the theme of the
display. This exception avoids an absolute ban on the display of
sacred text but instead allows its display when the connection to a
secular theme will be apparent. For example, the Supreme Court
frieze which contains Moses holding tablets exhibiting some of the
text of the secularly phrased Commandments would be
constitutional under this test. The frieze logically fits within a
display of great lawgivers and is narrowly tailored to include only
those Commandments that connect with the theme2
°
B. Applying the Presumption of Unconstitutionality Test
These practical and workable suggestions are much better
than what the Court provided and will go a long way in resolving
the non-uniformity of the present cases dealing with government
displays of the Ten Commandments. Analysis of the Kentucky and
Texas cases becomes much simpler using these factors, instead of
the current reasonable observer framework which relies on "offsite
explanations or subtly implied secular messages.",201 Under this new
approach, the Kentucky and the Texas displays would be presumed
unconstitutional because of the use of sacred text instead of
symbols. The government in both cases would have failed to
adequately rebut the presumption because the displays would not
fit within either the de minimis use exception or the narrowly
tailored inclusion exception. The displays would fail to fit within
the de minimis use exception because neither of the displays was a
generic reference to a religious thought used in conjunction with a
secular or ceremonial function. Instead, the government displayed
200. Id. at 2741. Justice Souter wrote: "Nor do we have occasion to hold
that a sacred text can never be integrated constitutionally into a governmental
display on the subject of law, or American history." Id.
201. Petitioner's Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 164, at 11.
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the entire text of the Ten Commandments which express a core
belief or tenet of a particular religion.
202
Displaying the full text of the Ten Commandments would
not satisfy Justice O'Connor's ceremonial deism test which
examines four factors: (1) the history and ubiquity of the item, (2)
whether it requires worship or prayer, (3) whether it refers to a
specific religion and (4) whether there is minimal religious
content.'03 The only ceremonial deism element satisfied by either of
the Ten Commandments displays is that neither required a person
to worship or pray. Although non-religious references to the Ten
Commandments may be common,204 actual displays of the Ten
Commandments in public buildings are relatively new and the
Kentucky display is very recent. In addition, even the longevity of
the more historical Ten Commandment displays, such as the Texas
monument, do not make them ubiquitous. They in no way compare
to the "In God We Trust" verbiage on our coins which Americans
use daily.
202. In the McCreary County courthouse at issue, the Ten
Commandments were listed as:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images.
Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honor thy father and thy mother.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness.
Thou shalt not covet.
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2728.
203. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37-44 (2004).
204. See generally JEAN CHATZKY, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF
FINANCIAL HAPPINESS: FEEL RICHER WITH WHAT YOU'VE GOT (2005);
STEPHEN GULLO, THE THIN COMMANDMENTS DIET: THE TEN NO-FAIL
STRATEGIES FOR PERMANENT WEIGHT Loss (2005); ROBERT K. WINTERS,
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF MINDPOWER GOLF (2004).
205. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance,
and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118
HARV. L. REV. 155, 237 (2004). Professor Laycock notes that:
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Moreover, the Commandments favor religion over non-
religion and most people would understand which religions in
particular are linked to the Commandments. Finally, while the
opening prayer of the legislative session or the Pledge of Allegiance
have minimal religious content and a tradition separate from their
religious origins, the Ten Commandments have retained their
substantial religious content and significance which prevents them
from fitting in Justice O'Connor's ceremonial deism exception.2
The text contains multiple references to God and several of the
Commandments have no link to any secular law.
Besides not being used in a ceremonial function, this display
of the Decalogue does not fit within the category of a brief
quotation from a religious source with a meaning that is equivalent
to secular sentiments. No secular sentiment exists for the
Commandments and especially not for the ones focusing on
worshiping the Lord. Instead, they have a sacred meaning to the
various religious groups that adhere to them, which is not
necessarily replicated in society at large.
In addition, the displays also fail to fit within the narrowly
tailored inclusion exception because no logical connection of the
core religious beliefs with the surrounding theme existed. Even if a
logical connection existed, that connection was not objectively
apparent at the site. The announced theme of the Kentucky display
was the origins of American law and government. However, then
the message of legal development of American law would at most
be "subtly implied and undeveloped. '"2'7 To fit within the narrowly
tailored inclusion exception, only the parts of the Ten
Commandments that arguably relate to American law should have
The "Ten Commandments" are well known as a
phrase and as a concept, but no version of the text is
well known; I am confident that most Americans could
not list the Ten Commandments. The reasonable
observer is not familiar with the text, let alone with any
ubiquitous secular use of the text.
Id.
206. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 43 (noting that "the reference to 'God' in the
Pledge of Allegiance qualifies as a minimal reference to religion").
207. Petitioner's Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 164, at 18.
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been displayed. Instead, the display also included Commandments
that were purely religious in nature: "Thou shalt have no gods but
me; Thou shalt not make upon thee any graven images; Thou shalt
not take the name of the Lord Thy God in vain; Remember the
sabbath day, to keep it holy; and Honor thy Father and thy
Mother. ' ' 208 None of these Commandments provide a basis for an
American law. The message of endorsement of the Ten
Commandments was clear, explicit, and not negated by anything at
the site of the display.
As to the other five Commandments, scholars dispute
whether they actually influenced American law. Furthermore, even
if the government's premise was accurate and these last five
Commandments influenced American law, that connection should
be objectively apparent at the display itself. Although the
explanatory plaque in Kentucky attempted to do this, it failed
because it was based on conclusory, inaccurate, exaggerated, and
• . 209
disputed claims of secular significance. Someone looking at the
display would not readily see the connection the plaque tried to
make since it focused on the Declaration of Independence which
does not mirror the Ten Commandments. The government's only
other attempt to make connections between the Ten
Commandments and American law came not at the display, but in
briefs which were inaccessible to an actual observer. The
government could have negated the religious message by including
other sources, both religious and secular, which influenced the
foundations of our laws as well as by including only the relevant
portions of the Ten Commandments. But the government chose
not to do that, instead displaying one particular version of a sacred
text to the exclusion of other versions and other documents that
may have played a role in our nation's laws. The displays were one-
20& McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2728.
209. Petitioner's Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 164, at 19
("Even if there were an explicit statement that the Ten Commandment were
significant in the development of American law, that conclusory, overbroad,
and contentious statement would not negate the endorsement of the
Commandments themselves, as this Court correctly held in Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980).").
177
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sided, not only due to the selection of one version of the Decalogue,
but also because the secular message was incomplete.
The Ten Commandments displayed on the Texas
monument provided even less of a connection with its secular
theme. No obvious and logical connection existed between the Ten
Commandments and recognizing the Fraternal Order of Eagles'
efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency. In addition, the implicit goal
of recognizing the historical role of the Ten Commandments in
American culture and law can only be imagined by a passer-by
since there is nothing on site that makes mention of this goal.
Again, even if evidence connecting that theme to the Ten
Commandments existed at the site, only those Commandments that
actually related to the theme could be constitutionally displayed.
Before concluding, two other situations need to be
addressed. First, a disclaimer at the site of the display" ° indicating
that the government does not intend to endorse religion will not
automatically overcome the presumption of an improper purpose.
The Court still must determine if the display fits into the de minimis
exception or the narrowly tailored inclusion exception. A display
of the entire text of the Ten Commandments will rarely fit into
either of these exceptions and a simple disclaimer, analogous to the
fine print in a contract, would not be sufficient to save the display.
The second situation arises, as in the Kentucky case, when a
plaintiff has actual, not imputed knowledge, of the government
trying to display sacred text for a religious purpose. In such a
situation, the government will likely be unable to argue successfully
that the sacred text display falls within either of the exceptions,
thereby rendering the display unconstitutional. This was certainly
the case with the Kentucky display. However, it is possible that a
plaintiff has actual knowledge of an improper governmental
purpose and yet the display is either narrowly tailored to include
210. Some governments have done this. See, e.g., Nancy Lofholm,
Monument Gets Disclaimer, DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 2001, at B6 ("Grand
Junction is following the example of Pocatello, Idaho, where controversy over
a Ten Commandments monument at a county building was settled with the
addition of a disclaimer."); see also Disclaimer for Idaho Falls Ten
Commandments Monument (picture on file with FALR, courtesy of Professor
Thomas Metzloff)).
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only that text which relates to the secular theme or is a generic
reference to a religious thought. In this case, the display would
qualify as a de minimis exception. Some will surely argue that the
government's actions still violate the Establishment Clause despite
fitting into the exceptions. Any other result, they say, would only
encourage government officials to continue to use religion for
political purposes. They feel blatant religious motives actually
known to a plaintiff requires a finding of unconstitutionality
because to that individual no fiction exists that the government
intends to endorse religion.
Critics of this approach argue that as long as the display fits
into one of the exceptions it should stand despite the knowledge of
a religious purpose. Eliminating all religious motives is unrealistic
because religious motives often underlie governmental actions and
this does not necessarily lead to a bad result."' For example,
religion has motivated the enactment of many valuable laws
including civil rights and abolition legislation."'
However, the better argument for permitting an otherwise
constitutional display, despite announced religious motives, is that
the display itself should stand or fall on its own merits. The
separate conduct of a governmental official promoting religion
through statements or resolutions is a separate act that should be
reviewed apart from the validity of the display. If that separate
official act violates the Establishment Clause or otherwise is shown
to be conduct outside of the scope of the official's capacity, the
offending actor should be appropriately sanctioned. The problem is
the official, not the display. In this way, the effect of the display
will be judged not by those in the community who may have actual
knowledge of the official's statements, but the many individuals
inside and outside of the community who most certainly would not
have knowledge of those statements. To hold otherwise, and make
an actual observer's knowledge trump an otherwise valid display,
brings us back to the exact problem we are trying to avoid: different
results for identical displays and courts relying on extrinsic evidence
211. Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and
Political, 29 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 793, 803 (1996).
212. Id.
180 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.4
from sources other than the four corners of the display. In addition,
this approach avoids the difficulty of proving what a plaintiff
actually knows, how plaintiff came to that knowledge, and what
governmental actions might be sufficient to violate the
Establishment Clause. Courts deciding these two evidentiary issues
inevitably would contribute to another body of case law that would
be filled with even more inconsistencies than what we have now.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should adopt a presumption of
unconstitutionality for all sacred text displays and then engage in
the following two-part inquiry. First, is the text used in a de
minimis fashion? If the answer is yes, then the presumption is
rebutted. If the answer is no, then the second question is whether
or not the use of the text is narrowly tailored so that there is a
logical connection, obvious at the site, between the core religious
beliefs and the surrounding theme. This simpler analysis will not
only lead to more consistent results, but also will resolve the
problems associated with the reasonable observer approach. How
much knowledge a reasonable observer does or does not have
ceases to be an issue because prominent evidence must exist at the
site of the display that objectively connects the text to the theme.
Judges no longer have to determine what background knowledge a
person should be presumed to have since the focus is on what is at
the site, not inside a hypothetical person's mind. The danger of
favoring the majority is also removed because the government must
show objective proof that the religious text is necessary to the
explicit secular message of the display, not just included for no
apparent reason. This approach allows the court to examine the
individual circumstances of each individual case and sets no per se
rule. But unlike the current reasonable observer framework, it
provides more guidance to the lower courts by focusing on
objective criteria instead of subjective fictions.
